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Abstract 
 
In 2014, the PCAOB adopted a new auditing standard - AS 18 Related Parties - to improve auditors’ 
performance in related-party transaction (RPT) auditing. In this study, we investigate the impact 
of AS 18 on firms’ real RPT activities and audit fees by examining six years’ data surrounding the 
effective date of AS 18. Using a matched-pair difference-in-differences approach, we find 
significantly reduced RPT activities and increased audit fees following the adoption of AS 18. Our 
findings reveal that AS 18 has a greater impact on small client firms, particularly firms audited by 
non-Big-4 firms. In contrast, the Big-4 firms had already taken measures to improve their RPT 
audit procedures. We also find a more pronounced effect for firms with high ex-ante fraud risk. 
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Economic Consequences of Auditing Standards:  
Evidence from Auditing Standard No. 18 Related Parties 
1. Introduction 
Related-Party Transactions (RPTs) have been a contributing factor in numerous financial 
reporting frauds.1 Despite prominent corporate scandals, the auditing requirements have remained 
largely unchanged for over 30 years. The PCAOB deems RPTs as a critical area because they have 
historically represented an increased risk of material misstatements in financial statements. On June 
10, 2014, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard No. 18 (AS 18), Related Parties, superseding AU 
Section 334, Related Parties, and AU Section 9334, Related Parties: Auditing Interpretations of 
Section 334. AS 18 requires auditors to perform significantly enhanced auditing procedures on 
RPTs. The standard establishes requirements regarding “the auditor’s evaluation of a company’s 
identification of, accounting for, and disclosure of relationships and transactions between the 
company and its related parties” (AS 18, paragraph 1). While the PCAOB is particularly interested 
in obtaining empirical data regarding both benefits and costs that could be related to the newly-
issued standard (PCAOB, 2014), to date there is virtually no research that provides a quantitative 
analysis of the impact of this new standard. 
This paper investigates the economic consequence of AS 18 on companies’ RPT practices 
as well as their audit fees. Employing six years of hand-collected data surrounding the adoption of 
AS 18, we first assess whether companies change their RPT behaviors after the adoption of AS 18. 
Next, we examine whether auditors charge higher audit fees on RPTs following the enhanced 
auditing procedures required by AS 18. To obtain greater insight into the impact of AS 18, we 
condition our analyses on affected firms’ size, auditor type, and fraud risks. As not all RPTS are 
                                                
1 Enron, Tyco International, and WorldCom are notorious cases involving RPTs. 
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“created equal,” we further assess the differential impact of different types of RPTs based on 
transaction type. Specifically, following Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017), we divide RPTs into (1) 
Business RPTs (e.g., selling, buying, leasing, and M&A activities transactions), which are closer 
to the firm’s core business operation, and (2) Non-Business RPTs (e.g., transactions involving loans, 
donations to related charities, and consulting and legal services).2 Non-Business RPTs are more 
likely to reflect self-dealing rather than efficient contracting.  
Our results are consistent with the idea that enhanced auditing procedures constrain 
companies’ opportunistic behaviors. We find strong evidence that, relative to a size-, profitability- 
and industry-matched control sample, companies subject to the AS 18 regulation reduce their RPT 
engagement in the post AS 18 period. The reduction concentrates on Non-Business RPTs. The 
effect is also stronger for companies with smaller size, non-Big-4 auditors, or high fraud risks, 
suggesting that ex-ante firm characteristics and audit quality play a role in assessing the 
effectiveness of AS 18. 
We further find evidence of increased audit fees after AS 18. In particular, for small firms 
audited by non-Big-4 auditors, audit fees increase for both Business and Non-Business RPTs. In 
contrast, for clients of Big-4 audit firms, we only observe an increase in fees for Non-Business 
RPTs. There is virtually no audit-fee impact of AS 18 for large firms audited by Big-4 auditors. 
This implies that Big-4 auditors may have already implemented the necessary audit procedures and 
charged relevant RPT auditing hours for their large client firms prior to the AS 18 adoption. We 
also find these fee increases are higher for firms with greater fraud risks, further supporting the 
PCAOB’s risk-based “scaled approach” in auditing RPTs, as promoted in AS 18. 
In additional analyses, we find a change in RPT governance in the post AS 18 period. This 
                                                
2 Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) refer to Non-Business RPTs as “tone-based RPTs.” We follow their time-consuming 
and very detailed approach in separating the two types of RPTs. 
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change is likely in response to the new standard’s mandatory requirements for auditors to 
communicate with companies’ audit committees their assessments of firms’ RPT control 
procedures. Specifically, we observe a significant increase in the number of companies that adopt 
a formal written RPT policy and assign the audit committee as the authoritative committee to 
review and approve RPTs as a result of AS 18. These effects are stronger for small firms, suggesting 
another mechanism through which small firms improve their RPT governance besides external 
auditor monitoring. 
This paper contributes in several ways. From a practical perspective, it is a timely study to 
assess the impact of AS 18 on companies’ RPT practices. Our article provides empirical evidence 
on some economic consequences of the new standard, which may help practitioners and investors 
gain better insight into RPT-related issues. In particular, we demonstrate the role of regulation and 
auditors in shaping companies’ real RPT activities. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
document such an association.  
From a policy-making perspective, the PCAOB’s authority over the accounting profession 
has far-reaching implications on business communities. On one hand, such authority may help 
improve firm reporting quality and auditing practices; on the other hand, it could add undue burdens 
to client firms (and audit firms) without well-justified benefits. A better understanding of the costs 
and benefits of AS 18 will not only help the PCAOB assess the effectiveness of the new standard, 
it will also aid policymakers and practitioners in considering whether similar standards should be 
adopted elsewhere.  
From an academic perspective, the paper adds to research on RPTs by studying the relation 
between auditing and companies’ RPT practices. Although RPTs are potentially a risky practice 
red-flagged by the PCAOB, they have not yet received significant attention from researchers (see 
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further discussion in the next section).3 This study also contributes to research on the effects of 
PCAOB regulations.4 As pointed out by DeFond and Zhang (2014, 312), “While there is evidence 
that some changes brought about by regulatory intervention have improved audit quality, there is 
also evidence that the costs of these changes are high and it is not clear if there are net benefits.” 
DeFond and Zhang call for more research to understand the nature and extent of regulatory 
intervention in improving audit and corporate practices in the new regime. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Background of RPT Auditing Standards 
RPT auditing procedures have remained largely unchanged since the issuance of AU sec. 
335, Related-Party Transactions, in 1975. In 1983, AU sec. 335 was replaced by AU sec. 334. 
However, the nature and extent of the auditor’s responsibilities, as well as the procedures pertaining 
to related-party auditing, in AU sec. 335 were carried over into AU sec. 334 without significant 
modifications. AU sec. 334 removed guidance related to accounting considerations and disclosure 
standards for related parties to avoid unnecessary repetition with similar guidance in SFAS 57, 
which is now contained in ASC 850. 
The PCAOB felt that the existing requirements did not contain sufficient required 
procedures and were not sufficiently risk based, which could lead to inadequate auditor effort.5 AS 
18, effective since December 15, 2014, is meant to strengthen auditor performance requirements 
                                                
3 PCAOB Release No. 2013-001, page 36; PCAOB Release No. 2014-002, page 176. 
4 Abernathy, Barnes, and Stefaniak (2013) provide a synthesis of studies examining the economic consequences of 
PCAOB activities. They document that 70% of such research are after 2010, showing a growing trend of PCAOB 
research in more recent years. In the papers examined in this synthesis, only a few directly address the consequences 
of PCAOB auditing standards on auditors and their firms. The study concludes that “[a]s we learn more about the 
influence of the PCAOB, many prior views in academic research about the roles of auditors and regulators may warrant 
reinvestigation or further exploration.” 
5 PCAOB Release No. 2014-002, page 3. 
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in RPT auditing, an area that has historically represented increased risks of material misstatements 
in financial statements.  
Compared to AU sec. 334, regulations in AS 18 differ in several respects. First, AS 18 
provides a “scaled approach,” establishing basic required procedures rather than just guidance, to 
assist auditors in identifying red flags that indicate potential risks of material misstatements. These 
basic procedures are then supplemented by more in-depth procedures corresponding to the facts 
and circumstances of the company under an audit.6 Second, AS 18 is risk-based and is designed to 
align with and build upon risk-assessment standards (AS 12). Under AS 18, auditors are obligated 
to address the risk of material misstatements arising from other complementary areas of the audit 
when assessing potential RPT risks. Furthermore, AS 18 adds audit-committee communications, 
with an aim to ensure a common understanding between the auditor and the audit committee about 
the existence of related-party relationships and transactions and any significant unusual 
transactions. The standard requires the auditor to communicate with the audit committee on various 
aspects of its auditing of RPTs, to obtain relevant information during the auditor’s risk-assessment 
procedures, and to communicate to the audit committee their evaluation of the company’s 
identification of, accounting for, and disclosure of its relationships and transactions with related 
parties. Finally, AU sec. 334 states that the auditor should place primary emphasis on the adequacy 
of disclosure of RPTs. In contrast, AS 18 requires that the auditor evaluate both the accounting for, 
and disclosure of, RPTs. 
 
                                                
6 Such facts and circumstances may include the size of complexity of the transaction, the nature of the company’s 
relationships or transaction with its related parties, and the related risk of material misstatements in the financial 
statements (PCAOB 2014). 
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2.2 Prior Research  
Given the scale of the fraudulent cases detected that relate to RPTs, it is surprising to 
observe that studies on RPTs are relatively limited. We believe this is likely due to the time-
consuming hand collection of data required to assess RPTs. Existing studies find that RPTs can 
have a damaging impact on firms because these transactions are often associated with high 
restatement risks (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2017), high likelihood of fraudulent behaviors (Henry, 
Gordon, Reed, and Louwers, 2012), decreased firm value (Jiang, Lee, and Yue, 2010; Kohlbeck 
and Mayhew, 2010; Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 2006) and increased likelihood of financial 
distress (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012).  
Gordon et al. (2007) argue that ‘‘internal control has difficulty tracking related-party 
transactions’’ because of their complexity. External auditing is an alternative to corporate-
governance devices for reducing the occurrence of RPTs. External auditors are considered by 
investors as the first line of defense against fraud (La Porta, Lopez-de-Salinas, and Shleifer, 2006) 
because they can monitor and discipline managers (Francis and Wang, 2008) and enhance investor 
protection (Newman, Patterson, and Smith, 2005).  
While there is limited prior evidence on the impact of auditors on RPTs, there is hardly any 
evidence on the impact of the PCAOB auditing standards on companies’ RPT practices.7 Our study 
contributes by assessing whether an auditing regulation results in a change in firms’ RPT behaviors, 
audit fees, and RPT control procedures.  
 
                                                
7 See Gordon et al. (2007) for a synthesis of literature examining the relation between auditing and RPT. More recently, 
Bennouri et al. (2015) use a sample of 85 French companies over the period of 2002-2008 and find that companies 
audited by Big-4 auditors report fewer RPTs. Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) find that RPT firms pay lower audit fees 
over the period of 2001 -2007 (i.e., prior to AS 18). The paper attributes the finding to auditors’ limited responsibilities 
on RPTs and the possibility that RPT firms are associated with lower-quality audit firms.  
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2.3 Hypotheses 
Studies provide evidence that effective regulations play a valid role in restricting 
opportunistic activities by companies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008, Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2013; 
Iliev, 2010). AS 18 requires management to provide auditors with the names of all related parties 
and the transactions among them, and to make an assertion in the financial statements that RPTs 
are conducted on terms equivalent to those prevailing in an arm’s-length transaction. AS 18 also 
requires auditors to obtain written representations from management assuring that there are no side 
agreements or other arrangements undisclosed to the auditor, to perform sufficient procedures to 
obtain relevant evidence, and to actively communicate with the audit committees while performing 
the RPT auditing procedures.  
These new external monitoring requirements have the potential to enhance the audit 
committee’s oversight of management and to strengthen the systems and procedures the auditors 
use to identify and account for RPTs. In turn, this would constrain managements’ ability to use 
RPTs as a tool of opportunistic behavior and lead to the less frequent use of harmful RPTs by 
management. Additionally, the increased auditor scrutiny can also enhance companies’ corporate 
governance related to RPTs (McConomy, 1998; Manry, Tiras, and Wheatley 2003; Carcello and 
Li, 2013), resulting in improved internal RPT control procedures. For example, increased 
communication with the audit committee can improve the committee’s awareness of RPT 
behaviors. Further, the mandatory assessment of firms’ RPT control procedure is also likely to 
promote the initiation of a formal written RPT policy.  
With enhanced external and internal monitoring on RPTs following the AS 18 adoption, 
we anticipate that firms will reduce their opportunistic RPT activities. Furthermore, management 
may simply avoid the use of RPTs even if these RPTs are not opportunistic as the AS 18 
requirements could increase the management’s workload to provide the necessary evidence to 
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justify their involvements in RPTs. The additional workload may outweigh “any cost advantage a 
company may have from engaging in related-party transactions during its normal course of 
operation” and hence serve as “a deterrent against their use [of related party transactions]” (PCAOB 
2014, 183). Taken together, we expect the adoption of AS 18 will be associated with a reduction 
of companies’ RPT activities, leading to the first hypothesis.8,9 
 
H1: Firms decrease their RPT following the adoption of AS 18. 
 
H1 assumes that all RPTs have the same effects. However, prior literature concludes that 
not all RPTs reflect insider opportunism (e.g., Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2017, 2010; Ryngaert and 
Thomas 2012).10 Motivated by Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) and Hope, Lu, and Saiy (2019), we 
break down RPTs into Business RPTs and Non-Business RPTs as Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017)  
find that Non-Business RPTs are associated with an increased likelihood of restatements. To the 
extent that Non-Business RPTs are more likely to reflect insider opportunism, we expect the 
enhanced external and internal monitoring on RPTs following the AS 18 adoption to have a 
stronger impact on Non-Business RPTs. We do not propose formal hypotheses but we conduct 
analyses to investigate whether AS 18 affects these two types of transactions differently. 
In its 2014 release document of AS 18, the PCAOB states: “(T)he Board has observed that 
the facts underlying a significant percentage of the Board’s settled disciplinary actions to date have 
involved auditors’ failures to perform sufficient procedures regarding related party transactions. 
                                                
8 The hypotheses are stated in the alternative form. 
9 Counter arguments exist. Arguably, it could also be possible that AS 18 may result in increased RPTs (because 
previously undisclosed RPTs become disclosed under more stringent auditing procedures) or no change of RPTs at all 
(if enhanced auditing procedures required in AS 18 have already been voluntarily taken by auditors before the AS 18 
adoption). 
10 In other words, RPTs may reflect either self-dealing (opportunism) or efficient contracting. 
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Many of these cases involve smaller audit companies. Likewise, the Board’s inspection program 
has identified a range of deficiencies in auditing related party transactions, particularly with respect 
to audits of smaller public companies that were conducted by smaller domestic audit companies” 
(PCAOB 2014, 10).  
Echoing the Board’s observations, research highlights a heterogeneous quality of Big-4 and 
non-Big-4 audit firms (see DeFond and Zhang 2014 and Che, Hope, and Langli 2019 for a review 
of such studies). Big-4 auditors are less likely than non-Big-4 auditors to compromise their 
independence, as no single client dominates larger audit firms. 11 In addition, Big-4 firms have 
stronger incentives to protect their reputations and can provide more robust training programs and 
standardized audit methodologies.12 Because of the Big-4’s superior audit quality, it is likely that 
they are less likely to be involved in harmful RPTs ex ante. Therefore, increased scrutiny of auditors 
following AS 18 may not decrease Big-4 clients’ RPTs to the same extent as that of non-Big-4 
clients. As a result, we predict that the effect of AS 18 is more salient in reducing RPTs for clients 
of non-Big-4 firms than of Big-4 firms:  
 
H1a: The decrease of RPTs is more pronounced for firms audited by non-Big-4 than 
those audited by Big-4 audit firms. 
 
AS 18 takes a risk-based approach that aligns and builds upon the risk assessment standard 
AS 12. It requires auditors to heighten their scrutiny in areas that have historically represented a 
                                                
11 See DeFond and Zhang (2014) for a review of these studies.  
12 There exist a few studies that provide counter evidence to these assertions. These studies argue that non-Big-4 
auditors may not be inferior to Big-4 auditors (Chaney, Jeter, and Shivakumar 2004, Beyer and Sridhar 2006, Bar-
Yosef and Sarath 2005). However, the mixed results may arise from research-design deficiencies such as self-selection 
bias (DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
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high risk of material misstatements. Based on a number of high-profile scandals, we can easily 
argue that high fraud risk firms are more likely to be involved in high-risk RPTs. At the same time, 
auditors are required to take additional steps to audit firms’ RPTs more closely, leading to stricter 
inspection and monitoring. Consequently, we expect AS 18 to have a stronger impact on firms with 
high fraud risk:  
 
H1b: The decrease of RPTs is more pronounced for firms with high fraud risk than 
those with low fraud risk 
 
Although there is no existing empirical evidence on the impact of AS 18 on audit fees, prior 
studies examine how audit fees respond to new regulations. Some studies find increased audit fees 
when additional auditing procedures are needed (Hogan and Wilkins, 2008) or when auditors’ 
litigation risks are significantly increased (Iliev, 2010; Charles, Glover, and Sharp 2010; Carcello 
and Li, 2013). Other studies present evidence of decreased audit fees when the new regulation helps 
improve auditing efficiency (Krishnan, Krishnan, and Song 2011; Doogar, Sivadasan, and 
Solomon 2010). Overall, these studies show that the change of audit fees generally depends on 
whether the new regulation increases or decreases audit effort and litigation risk. 
We expect audit firms to charge higher audit fees after implementation of AS 18 as a result 
of the heavier workload it imposes on auditors, higher labor costs, and potentially increased 
litigation risk. Relative to the previous standard, AS 18 requires more extensive auditing procedures 
to detect RPT deficiencies. Specifically, it requires auditors to evaluate whether client firms have 
properly identified all their related parties and the transactions with these related parties. Should 
auditors identify any omissions, they must treat these omissions as an elevated risk and perform 
additional procedures to address the higher risk. Between the new procedures to test the accuracy 
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and completeness of management’s identification of related parties and the extra work to control 
audit risk, the auditors’ workload is significantly increased, which should result in higher audit fees. 
To successfully uncover all RPTs, audit firms may also need to train additional staff. Such 
increased labor costs would also likely lead to higher audit fees. Furthermore, because AS 18 
heightens the auditor’s responsibility to obtain assurance that all RPTs are identified, properly 
accounted for, and disclosed, failure to meet AS 18’s requirements by obtaining sufficient evidence 
can increase litigation risks related to audit quality. This could also lead to higher audit fees.  
The PCAOB supports the conjecture that the auditor fee will increase “as a result of the 
application of the standard and amendments” (PCAOB 2014, 182). The Board recognizes that 
“there may be increased costs for companies whose auditors must change their methodologies and 
practices to address the new requirements” (PCAOB 2014, 182). Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that the Board is uncertain if the increased audit costs will result in increased audit fees or the extent 
of the audit-fee increase, given the lack of empirical evidence available to provide insights 
regarding the costs.13 Taken together, our second hypothesis is: 
 
H2: There is an audit-fee increase associated with RPTs following the adoption of AS 
18 
 
Similar to the arguments for H1a and H1b, we expect the effects of AS 18 on audit fees to 
be more pronounced for firms audited by non-Big-4 audit firms and for firms with high risks: 
                                                
13 See PCAOB (2014, 182): “It is not clear to what extent the increased auditor performance requirements would result 
in increased audit fees. The Board is aware of public reports that have analyzed historical and aggregate data on audit 
fees, and which suggest that audit fees generally have remained stable in recent years, notwithstanding the fact that the 
Board and other auditing standard-setters have issued new standards during that period. It is difficult to obtain data 
that isolates the costs of particular new audit standards, and that would be comparable between companies. In its re-
proposal, the Board sought data that might provide information or insight into such costs. As noted above, commenters 
did not provide data regarding the extent of such costs.”  
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H2a: The increase in audit fees is more pronounced for companies audited by non-
Big-4 than those audited by Big-4 audit firms. 
 
H2b: The increase in audit fees is more pronounced for companies with high fraud 
risk than firms with low fraud risk.  
 
3. Sample Selection and Research Design 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We hand-collect RPT information from companies’ proxy statements from 2011 to 2016. 
AS 18 has been in effect since December 15, 2014; thus the sample includes three years prior to 
and three years after the effective date. Because we want to evaluate the impact on Big-4 and non-
Big-4 firms separately, we start our sample with all 287 non-financial Russell 3000 companies 
audited by non-Big-4 firms. Excluding financial and utility firms and firms with missing values, 
we then match each non-Big-4 client firm with a Big-4 client firm by industry, firm size, and 
profitability.14 To control for potentially confounding time-period factors that may coincide with 
the new standard, we match a group of Canadian firms that are not listed in the U.S. and hence are 
not subject to AS 18 as a control group. Specifically, for each non-Big-4/Big-4 client firm in our 
U.S. sample, we match a non-Big-4/Big-4 Canadian firm.  
Because the non-Big-4 client firms in the main tests are relatively small, the matched Big-
4 client firms in the above sample are smaller than typical clients of Big-4 audit firms. 
                                                
14 When matching between Non-Big4 and Big4 clients, we first rank all Russel 3000 firms by total revenue and return 
on assets in 2014 for each Fama-French 48 industry. Then, for each Non-Big4 client, we identify a Big-4 client with 
the closest ROA and total revenue in the same industry. On average the calibration is smaller than 5%. 
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Consequently, in additional analyses we focus our attention on S&P 500 firms that are audited by 
Big4.15 The downside to this approach is that it is not possible to match with Canadian firms on 
firm size as most large Canadian firms are subject to PCAOB because they either use U.S GAAP 
or have their shares traded on a U.S. exchange.16  
Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of our samples. Our final sample consists of 133 U.S. 
non-Big-4 client firms (Group A1), 133 U.S. Big-4 client firms (Group B1), 133 Canadian non-
Big-4 client firms (Group A2), 133 Canadian Big-4 client firms (Group B2), and 320 S&P 500 
firms (Group C1). The total sample is 5,112 firm-year observations.17 Table 1 summarizes our 
sample construction for both the main and additional tests. We cluster standard errors by firm in 
all regression analyses. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Impact of AS 18 on RPT (Test of H1) 
 
 For the primary analyses, we test the change in RPTs using a difference-in-differences 
model: 
 
 
RPT = β 1Treat	× Post + β2 Treat + β3 Post + β4 Size + β5 ROA + β6 PB  + β7 
R&D + β8 R&D missing + β9 Leverage  + β10 NonBig-4 + Industry Fixed 
Effects + ε 
  (1) 
                                                
15 The Big-4 audit 497 of the S&P 500 companies in the year 2016. Excluding financial industry and observations with 
missing value, all our S&P 500 sample firms are audited by Big-4 auditors. 
16 Since we do not find any significant change in RPT behavior, audit fees, or RPT governance for S&P 500 firms after 
the adoption of AS 18, we do not view it as important to have a control group to further test whether changes are 
significant.  
17 We use different groups of samples for each test to better meet the analysis requirements.  
 14 
 
RPT is measured as the dollar amount of RPT divided by total assets. Treat equals one if 
the firm is subject to AS 18, zero otherwise; Post equals one when the sample year is after the 
effective date of AS 18, and zero otherwise. We expect β1 <0, indicating that in the post period, 
firms that are affected by AS 18 reduce their RPT engagement.  
We include several firm characteristics as control variables based on prior research. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is the return on assets of the firm, defined as net income 
(before extraordinary items) divided by total assets. PB is the price to book ratio, measured as the 
ratio of market value of total equity over book value of total equity. R&D is the research and 
development expense divided by total assets; R&D missing equals one if R&D is missing; zero 
otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. NonBig-4 equals one if the firm is 
audited by one of the non-Big-4 auditors. Definitions of all variables are summarized in the 
Appendix. 
 To test whether the AS 18 effects (if any) on RPT are more pronounced for non-Big-4 firms 
(H1a) and high-risk firms (H1b), we apply models (2) and (3) by focusing only on the U.S. firms 
and interact Post with NonBig-4 or Risk. In both models, we also include a set of control variables 
that depict firms’ governance characteristics.18 Firm Age is the number of years since the firm was 
initially listed. Ext. Directors is the percentage of independent directors on the board. Inst. Holdings 
is the percentage of shares hold by institutional investors. CEO Duality equals to one if the CEO is 
also the Chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. CEO tenure is the number of years since the 
current CEO was appointed.  
 
                                                
18 Models 2 and 3 have the same sets of controls. We use different sets of controls in Model 1 because the corporate 
governance controls are not available for Canadian firms in our sample.  
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RPT = β1 NonBig-4×Post +β 2 Post + β3 NonBig-4 + β4 Size + β5 ROA + β7 PB 
+ β8 Leverage + β9 R&D + β8 R&D Missing+ β9 Firm Age + β10 Ext. 
Director +β11 Inst. Holdings + β12CEO Duality + β13 CEO Tenure+ 
+Industry Fixed Effects + ε (2) 
 
 Model (2) tests whether the AS 18 effect (if any) is stronger for non-Big-4 client firms. We 
expect β 1 <0, implying that non-Big-4 client firms reduce more RPTs in the post period.  
 
RPT = β 1Risk×Post +β 2 Post + β3 Risk + β4 Size + β5 ROA + β7 PB + β8 
Leverage + β9 R&D + β8 R&D missing+ β10 Ext. Director +β11 Inst. 
Holdings + β12CEO Duality + β13 CEO Tenure +Industry Fixed Effects 
+ ε (3) 
 
Model (3) tests if any AS 18 effect is more pronounced for high-risk firms than for low-
risk firms. To mitigate the potential impact of the auditor’s quality, in model (3) we only focus on 
clients of Big-4 audit firms. We expect β 1 <0, implying high-risk firms reduce more RPTs in the 
post period. 
We construct Risk in two steps. In the first step, we use AAERs issued between 2000 and 
2016 to construct a logistic probability score using a logit model following Doogar et al. (2010):  
 
AAER = β 1 Accruals + β2∆ Rec+ β3∆ Inv+ β4∆ CS+ β5∆ ROA+ β6 issue (4) 
   
Accruals are abnormal accruals computed as per Richardson et al. (2005); ∆ Rec is the 
change in receivables divided by total assets; ∆ Inv is the change in inventory divided by total 
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assets; ∆ CS is the change in cash sales divided by total assets; ∆ ROA is change in return on 
assets, and Issue is an indicator for issuance of securities during the year. In the second step, we 
calculate an expected AAER probability for each firm year. We assign the variable Risk a value 
of one to firms with expected AAER probability above the sample median, and zero otherwise.  
 
3.2.3 Impact of AS 18 on Audit Fees (Test of H2) 
 
To test for potential changes in audit fees, we use the following model. 
 
The definitions of RPT and Post are the same as before. In accordance with H2, we expect 
β1 >0, meaning that auditors charge higher auditor fees for firms with RPT after the adoption of 
AS 18. Consistent with prior literature, we control for several firm characteristics that may affect 
audit fees (Doogar et al., 2010, Carcello and Li, 2013). Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
ROA is the return on assets of the firm. Segment is the number of firm’s business segments. Loss 
equals one when the firm reports a negative net income, and zero otherwise. Late is the number of 
days between the filing date and the date of the fiscal year end. Busy equals one when the firm’s 
year ends in December, and zero otherwise.19 Quick is the ratio of cash equivalents and accounts 
                                                
19 Audit firms generally charge higher audit fees when the firm’s year ends in December, given that it is generally the 
busiest period for auditors. 
Audit Fee = β1 RPT ×Post + β2 RPT + β3 Post + + β4 Size +  β5  ROA + β6 Segment 
+  β7 Loss +  β8 Late +  β9 Busy +  β10Quick +  β11 Leverage +  β12 
AR&Inv +  β13Foreign Operation+  β14 Volatility + β15 Auditor Market 
Share +  β16 Customer Importance +  β17 Auditor Change + β18 NonBig-
4 +  Industry Fixed Effects + ε (5) 
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receivable to current liabilities. Leverage is total liabilities over total assets. AR&INV is the sum of 
accounts receivable and inventory over total assets. Foreign Operation equals one if the firm has 
operations in a foreign country. Volatility is the standard deviation of ROA over the past five years; 
Auditor Market Share is measured as the audit fees of an auditor divided by total audit fees in a 
Fama-French 48 industry. Customer Importance is the percentage of a firm’s audit fees divided by 
the auditors’ total audit fees in a Fama-French 48 industry. Audit Change is an indicator that equals 
one if a firm changes it auditor in a given year, zero otherwise; NonBig-4 equals one when the firm 
is audited by a non-Big 4 firm, and zero otherwise. We also include industry fixed effects.  
To test if the AS 18 effects on audit fees (if any) are more salient for clients of non-Big-4 
firms (H2a), we partition sample firms into clients of non-Big-4 and Big-4 firms, and assess 
whether the coefficient on RPT×Post is significantly higher for non-Big-4 client firms. To test if 
the AS 18 effects on audit fees are stronger for high-risk firms (H2b), we partition sample firms 
into high-risk and low-risk firms, and observe whether the coefficient on RPT×Post is higher for 
high-risk firms. 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. Panel A provides statistics for the treatment firms. 
Focusing on the “Total” column, on average, 46% of U.S. firms disclosed at least one RPT. Each 
firm-year discloses 0.89 RPTs and the average RPT amount is approximately 0.86% of total assets 
($2.8M).  
Panel A further presents descriptive statistics comparing clients of non-Big-4 small, Big-4 
small, and Big-4 large firms (i.e., S&P 500).20 The average RPT amounts for non-Big 4 and Big-4 
                                                
20 There is no NonBig-4 large firm group as in U.S. Big-4 auditors dominate the auditing market for large firms. 
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small client firms are 2.64% and 0.79%, respectively. This suggests that non-Big 4 client firms 
report more RPTs than matched Big-4 firms and is consistent with prior literature that auditors’ 
reputations are associated with the occurrence of RPTs (Bennouri, Nekhili, and Touron 2015). 
Business characteristics are mostly comparable between non-Big 4 and Big-4 firms, suggesting 
these two groups of observation are well matched. For S&P 500 firms, the average RPT is 0.09%, 
which as expected is smaller than for the other two groups (recall that RPT amounts are scaled by 
total assets).  
Panel B reports the comparison between the treatment group (U.S. firms) and control group 
(Canadian firms) and shows that the two groups are mostly comparable in their firm characteristics. 
However, on average, U.S. firms are slightly less leveraged, more profitable, and have higher PB 
ratios. Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations and shows that large firms, firms audited by non-
Big 4 auditors and firms with fewer independent directors, lower institutional holdings, and dual 
CEOs are more likely to disclose more RPTs. We do not find high correlations between the 
explanatory variables, suggesting multi-collinearity is not a serious concern in our analyses.21  
 
4.2 Main Results 
4.2.1 Results of H1 – AS 18 Effects on RPT 
 
  In Table 4, we investigate whether firms change their RPT behavior following the adoption 
of AS 18. In the main analyses we employ RPT transaction amounts as the outcome variable. In 
Section 5.2 we consider alternative RPT proxies. The sample employed in Column (1) includes 
both clients of non-Big 4 and Big-4 (small) firms in the U.S. (treatment sample) and matched 
Canadian firms. As shown in Column (1), the coefficient on Treat× Post is negative and 
                                                
21 The variance inflation factor (VIF) of Treat × Post for the main analysis of H1 is 3.02 and the average VIF is 1.94. 
The VIF for RPT×Post for H2 is 5.51 and the average VIF is 1.95.  
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statistically significant (-1.315, t=-2.39), suggesting that compared to firms not subject to the 
PCAOB regulation, firms subject to PCAOB regulation significantly reduce their RPTs after the 
adoption of AS 18. This finding provides initial evidence for the idea that U.S. firms’ RPT practices 
are affected by AS 18 (H1). 
Post is positive but not significant (0.478, t=1.50), implying that the Canadian firms 
(control group) do not change their RPT behavior significantly in the post period. Similarly, Treat 
is not significant (5.971, t=1.48), consistent with scaled RPT amounts not being significantly 
different between U.S. firms (treatment group) and Canadian firms (control group) in the pre-AS 
18 period.  
Clearly, firms have related parties for a variety of reasons, and not only to extract private 
benefits from minority shareholders. In other words, not all RPTs are “created equal.” In Columns 
2 and 3, we manually decompose RPTs into Non-Business RPTs (NonBusinessRPT) and Business 
RPTs (BusinessRPT) following Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017).22 Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) 
suggest that Non-Business RPTs signal a higher risk of material misstatements and are more likely 
to represent conflict of interests between insiders and shareholders. We find that Treat ×Post is 
significant for Non-Business RPTs (-0.737, t = -2.40), but not for Business RPTs (-0.578, t=-1.32), 
consistent with the idea that the new standard has the effect of reducing the prevalence of “bad 
RPTs.”23 
In Table 5, we focus on the treatment (U.S.) firms and investigate how the AS 18’s effects 
on RPT are affected by the type of auditors and ex-ante firm fraud risk. To test H1a, we regress 
                                                
22 Business RPTs involve selling, buying, leasing, and M&A. Non-Business RPTs include all other RPTs such as 
donation, consulting, legal service, etc. See Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) and Hope, Lu, and Saiy (2019) for further 
details. 
23 The difference is not significant though with a t-statistics of 0.73 
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RPTs on Non-Big-4 × Post, controlling for other firm characteristics.24 The results are presented 
in Panel A of Table 5. In Column 1, we find that clients of Big-4 firms reduce their RPTs as the 
coefficient on Post is negative (-0.187, t = -1.85). More importantly, clients of non-Big-4 firms 
reduce their RPTs to a greater extent as compared to their matched Big-4 client firms. Specifically, 
Non-Big-4 × Post is negative and significant (-1.704, t=-2.06), consistent with the PCAOB’s 
conjecture that firms audited by non-Big-4 auditors would be more affected by AS 18.  
In Column 2 and 3, we find that non-Big-4 firms significantly reduce both Non-Business 
RPTs (-0.398, t=-1.78) and Business RPTs (-1.296, t=-1.71), while Big-4 firms only reduce their 
Non-Business RPTs (-0.098, t=-2.28). These findings have two implications. First, the Business 
RPTs in firms audited by Big-4 auditors are more likely to be efficiently contracted ex ante than 
those in the non-Big-4 firms, in part because of higher auditing quality by Big-4 auditors. Second, 
Non-Business RPTs are more likely to reflect conflicts of interest; however, prior to the new 
standard neither Big-4 nor non-Big-4 firms invested sufficiently in auditing these transactions. As 
a result, when AS 18 mandates new auditing procedures, Non-Business RPTs are reduced for firms 
audited by both types of auditors.  
AS 18 is designed to be risk-based and comply with risk-assessment standards. In Table 5, 
Panel B, we test whether the reduction of RPT is conditional on the firm’s expected fraud risk. In 
line with Doogar et al. (2010), we measure fraud risk using expected AAER probability. Column 
1 shows that for firms with high fraud risks, RPT is significantly reduced (-1.765, t=-2.11), while 
for firms with low fraud risks, the RPT reduction is not significant (-0.128, t=-0.57). In Columns 2 
and 3, we find that reduction of Non-Business RPTs is unconditional on risk (-0.183, t=-1.18), but 
that the reduction of Business RPTs is concentrated on high-risk firms (-1.583, t=-2.21), suggesting 
                                                
24 We use the variable “NonBig-4” instead of “Big-4” to avoid the joint test of Big-4 and Big-4 × Post in the regression 
to show a regulation impact on Big-4 clients. 
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that Non-Business RPTs are generally inefficient in nature and that Business RPTs (although on 
average less opportunistic than Non-Business RPTs) are more likely to be opportunistic when the 
risk is high. 
The above results provide evidence that the reduction of RPTs is conditional on auditor 
type and fraud risks. We next examine whether these two findings are unique given that it is likely 
that firms with high fraud risk and non-Big-4 auditors are more likely to select each other either 
proactively or passively. In Panel C, we further partition the sample in Panel B by auditor type and 
find that the reduction of RPTs concentrates on firms with high risks for both non-Big-4 (-3.636, t 
= -2.39) and Big-4 firms (=1.196, t = -1.90), suggesting that our RPT findings regarding the auditor 
type and fraud risks reveal different aspects of AS 18’s consequences.  
Overall, the results in Panels B and C provide evidence that the RPT reduction is more 
pronounced for firms with high fraud risk, regardless of auditors’ type. The findings are consistent 
with the argument that when firms have high fraud risk, their RPTs are more likely to relate to 
opportunistic behavior ex ante. When taking a risk-based scalable approach, auditors make greater 
effort and assert higher scrutiny in the RPT monitoring, leading to a higher degree of reduction in 
RPTs, supporting H1b.  
 
4.2.2 Audit-Fees Analyses 
AS 18 aims to improve RPT auditing by taking a risk-based approach that requires 
mandatory auditing steps and additional audit procedures correspondent with the situation. The 
new requirements likely lead to an increased workload for auditors. Auditors in turn may partially 
or fully transfer this burden to their client firms, increasing the audit fees charged to firms. In Table 
6, we investigate whether this increased audit effort is reflected in audit fees. Column 1 shows that, 
for the full sample, there is no change in audit fees sensitivity to RPTs as the coefficient on 
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RPT×Post (0.003, t=0.69) is not significant. However, when decomposing RPTs into Non-
Business RPTs and Business RPTs in Column 2, we find that firms face significantly higher audit 
fees associated with Non-Business RPTs (0.016, t = 2.50), but not with Business RPTs (0004, 
t=0.92), suggesting that AS 18 increases the auditor’s efforts on RPTs that are most likely to be 
harmful to minority shareholders. 
In Table 7, we further investigate whether the relation detected in Table 6 differs by auditor 
types and fraud risks. In Panel A, we find that non-Big-4 auditors increase audit fees for both Non-
Business RPTs (0.018, t=2.07) and Business RPTs (0.011 t=2.95), while Big-4 auditors only 
increase their audit fees on Non-Business RPTs (0.046, t=2.42). These results are consistent with 
our findings in Panel A of Table 5, whereby firms audited by non-Big-4 auditors reduce both Non-
Business RPTs and Business RPTs as a result of AS 18, yet firms audited by Big-4 auditors only 
reduce Non-Business RPTs. This suggests that the reduction of RPTs is a result of increased 
auditing efforts after the adoption of AS 18.  
In Panels B and C of Table 7, we find that the audit-fee increase concentrates on firms with 
high risk, consistent with PCAOB’s assertion that AS 18 is taking a scaled risk-based approach. 
When the firm’s ex-ante risk is high, auditors take more steps and put more effort in RPT auditing, 
resulting in higher audit fees. Overall, we find evidence that AS 18 significantly changed auditors’ 
efforts in RPT auditing, as proxied by audit fees. Following AS 18, both Big-4 auditors and non-
Big-4 auditors increase their audit-fee sensitivity on RPTs. The change is stronger for clients of 
non-Big-4 firms and for high-risk firms. 
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5. Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
5.1 Impact of AS 18 on RPT Governance  
One possible mechanism for RPT reduction, as we examine in our primary analyses, is 
through enhanced auditor monitoring. Another potential mechanism is enhanced internal RPT 
control. Research shows that audit scrutiny can increase companies’ corporate governance and 
control procedures (McConomy, 1998; Manry et al., 2003; Carcello and Li, 2013). The increased 
auditor scrutiny could increase companies’ corporate governance on RPTs (McConomy, 1998; 
Manry et al., 2003; Carcello and Li, 2013). Based on prior literature and findings, we explore two 
possible effects. First, the new standard requires auditors to understand and evaluate the company’s 
RPT control-procedure policies. This enhanced external auditing is expected to promote the 
initiation of a formal written RPT policy. The PCAOB projects that management may be more 
attentive to written procedures and responsibilities for RPTs as a result of AS 18. Second, auditors 
are required in AS 18 to make inquiries of the audit committee members about their understanding 
of and concerns relating to RPTs and to make additional communication to audit committees about 
the auditors’ evaluation of the company’s identification of, accounting for, and disclosure of RPTs. 
In addition, if the auditor learns of a related-party relationship or transaction that management did 
not disclose, the auditor must advise the audit committee. These requirements are likely to make 
the audit committee more closely involved in the RPT audit. If a company’s board uses another 
committee to review and approve RPTs, then the overlapping of RPT assessment between the two 
committees may make the responsibility unclear and decrease the efficiency of monitoring. As a 
result, we expect the auditors’ involvement with the audit committee, as required by AS 18, to 
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increase the likelihood for companies to delegate the audit committee as the responsible party for 
reviewing and approving RPTs rather than other board-level committees.  
We argue that following AS 18, firms are more likely to delegate the audit committee 
responsible for RPT ratification and to adopt a formal written RPT policy because of the increased 
communication with audit committee and a mandatory assessment of RPT control procedures. We 
use a logit model to test if there is a change in RPT governance in the post-AS 18 period.  
 
Adoption of  = 
Control  
Procedure    
β 1 Post + β2 NonBig-4 + β3 Size + β4 ROA + β5 PB + β6 Leverage + β7 
R&D + β8 R&D missing+ β9 Ext.Director +β10 Inst. Holdings + 
β11Dual Shares + β12CEO Duality + β13 CEO Tenure + β13 Exchange 
+ β13Delaware+Industry Fixed Effects + ε 8 
 
For the test of written policy, Adoption of Control Procedure equals one if the firm has a 
written RPT policy. For the test of audit-committee delegation, Adoption of Control Procedure 
equals one if the firm delegates the audit committee as the responsible party for reviewing and 
approving RPTs. We expect the coefficient on Post to be positive, implying that after the adoption 
of AS 18, companies change their RPT control procedures. 
We add two new controls to the regression. Exchange equals one if the firm is listed on 
NASDAQ, and zero otherwise. We add this control because NASDAQ and NYSE have different 
governance requirements that could affect firms’ governance practice. Next, Delaware equals one 
for firms incorporated in Delaware, and zero otherwise. As documented in prior studies, Delaware 
firms often have different governance practices (e.g., Daines 2001). 
Table 8 shows that, in the post-AS 18 period, firms on average are more likely to use the 
audit committee for RPT ratification (0.336, t=3.81) and to adopt a written RPT policy (0.490, 
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t=5.25). However, we cannot simply attribute this change in RPT control procedure to AS 18, 
because we cannot rule out the alternative explanation that RPT governance improves over time 
without the intervention of regulation.25,26 
 
5.2 Alternative RPT Measures  
In the main analyses, we measure RPTs using transaction amounts divided by total assets 
(thus capturing economic importance or materiality). In Table 10, we repeat the main analyses 
employing alternative measures: the number of RPTs (#RPT) and the existence of RPTs (DRPT). 
We find significant reduction in both #RPT and DRPT, adding robustness to the argument that 
there is a reduction of RPTs following the adoption of AS 18. In contrast, we do not find 
significance in audit-fees change associated with #RPT or DRPT. A plausible explanation is that 
auditors alter their efforts based on materiality of transactions, not simply on the occurrence of 
RPTs or number of RPTs, consistent with materiality being a primary auditing principle. 
 
5.3 AS 18 Impact on Small vs. Large Firms 
The PCAOB noted that there may be particular risks posed by RPTs engaged in by smaller 
companies and conjectured that AS 18 may particularly affect smaller companies that rely on RPTs 
as part of their business model. In its oversight findings, the PCAOB finds that audits of smaller 
companies are more frequently the subject of inspection findings and enforcement actions that 
involve RPTs. 27  “Also it is generally acknowledged that investors are less informed about 
                                                
25 To be precise, for this test we cannot use Canadian firms as a control sample because IFRS does not require RPT 
governance disclosure.  
26 In untabulated analyses, we find the improvements in RPT governance are not associated with auditor type or fraud 
risk, consistent with the idea that the communication with the audit committee is mandatory and that the audit of firms’ 
RPT governance increases firms’ likelihood to adopt a written RPT policy 
27 PCAOB 2014, Page 10. 
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companies that are smaller, suggesting that there is a higher degree of information asymmetry for 
smaller companies.”28 In part because of less information available regarding smaller companies 
(e.g., they have lower analyst following and press coverage), smaller firms are more likely to 
engage in harmful RPTs ex ante. Thus, the increased auditor scrutiny could have stronger effects 
on smaller companies than large companies.  
Given our sample-selection procedures, our sample consists of mainly smaller firms 
because we first identify clients of non-Big-4 audit firms and then match each with a Big-4 client 
firm by size, profitability, and industry. To expand our analysis to large firms, we focus on S&P 
500 firms and examine the impact of AS 18 on these large firms in Table 10. All S&P 500 sample 
firms are audited by Big-4s and they usually have better corporate governance than small firms. 
Thus, it is not surprising that we find that AS 18 virtually has no impact on S&P 500 firms. There 
is no significant change in RPT engagement, RPT audit fees, or RPT governance. Consistent with 
PCAOB’s expectation, untabulated analyses reveal that the economic consequences of AS 18 
between large firms and small firms are significantly different, suggesting the AS 18 effects are 
more pronounced for small firms. 
 
5.4 Alternative Risk Measurement 
In the main analyses, we measure firm’s risk using the expected probability of AAER. In a 
robustness test, we measure risk as the expected restatement risk. The results show that the 
economic consequences of AS 18 are also more pronounced when restatement risk is high 
(untabulated).  
 
                                                
28 PCAOB 2014, Page 192. 
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6. Conclusion 
In 2014, the PCAOB adopted Auditing Standards No. 18 (AS 18) to improve auditors’ 
performance in auditing related-party transactions (RPTs). In this paper, we examine economic 
consequences of AS 18. We find that after the adoption of AS 18, U.S. firms significantly reduce 
their RPT involvements. This reduction is more pronounced for smaller firms, firms audited by 
non-Big4 auditors, and for firms with high fraud risk. We also find firms are more likely to adopt 
formal written RPT policies and delegate authority to the audit committee in the post AS 18 period. 
In addition, firms audited by non-Big-4 auditors and with higher fraud risk are subject to higher 
audit fees, suggesting that non-Big-4 auditors significantly increase their effort in RPT auditing 
and this increased effort is reflected into the fees.  
These findings should be of interest to practitioners, investors, regulators, and academics. 
We document evidence that the PCAOB regulation did result in positive effects such as a reduction 
of harmful RPTs and improved RPT control procedures. While the PCAOB auditing standards are 
designed to improve auditing quality, our study shows that these regulations have greater impact 
on small firms than on large firms. Our study may warrant more considerations and analysis of the 
economic consequences on smaller firms for future PCAOB auditing standard setting. 
Our results should be interpreted with caution due to the limitations in sample selection and 
the caveats of matching models. First, there is no control group in the U.S. that are not subject to 
AS 18. Although we use a group of Canadian firms to test the policy effect, we cannot completely 
rule out the possibility that other contemporaneous events occurred in the U.S. that could drive our 
inferences. Second, similar to other research focusing on Big-4 effects, it is difficult to find a 
matched control group for large clients of Big-4 audit firms. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variables of Interest Definitions 
RPT Total dollar amount of RPTs divided by total assets.  
NonBusiness RPT Dollar amount of RPTs involving selling, buying, leasing and M&A 
activities 
 
Business RPT Dollar amount of RPTs that are not Non-Business RPTs 
 
AuditFee The logarithm of firm’s annual audit fees  
Post An indicator which equals to 1 if a firm’s fiscal year is after 2013; 
zero otherwise 
Treat An indicator which equals to 1 if a firm is subject to AS 18; zero 
otherwise 
  
Control Variables Definitions 
AAER Prob. The probability of firms is in the list of Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases, zero otherwise  
AR&Inv The sum of account receivable and Inventory divided by total asset. 
Auditor Change An indicator which equals to 1 if a firm changes it auditor in a given 
year; zero otherwise 
Auditor Market Share The audit revenue for an auditor divided by total audit fees in a Fama 
French 48 industry 
Big 4 An indicator which equals to 1 if a firm is audited by one of the Big-4 
auditors; zero otherwise 
Busy An indicator which equals to 1 if a firm has a fiscal year ends at Dec. 
31; zero otherwise 
CEO Duality An indicator which equals to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the 
Board 
CEO Tenue The number of years during which the CEO has been appointed for 
Customer Importance The percentage of a client’s audit fees divided by the auditor’s total 
audit fees in a Fama French 48 industry. 
Delaware An indicator which equals to 1 if the firm is incorporated in Delaware; 
zero otherwise 
Dual Share An indicator which equals to 1 if the firm have multiple class of 
shares; zero otherwise. 
Firm Age The number of years since firm’s IPO 
Foreign Operation An indicator which equals to 1 if the firms have foreign operations; 
zero otherwise 
Ext. director The percentage of independent directors over total board numbers.  
Industry Competition The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry market share using 
revenue. 
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Inst. Holdings The percentage of total shares owned by institutional shareholders 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets 
Loss An indicator which equals to 1 if a firm reports net loss in a given 
year; zero otherwise 
Nasdaq An indicator which equals to 1 if the firm is listed in Nasdaq. 
PB The price to book ratio, measured as the ratio of market value of total 
equity over book value of total equity 
Quick Quick ratio, measured as cash plus account receivable divided by 
current liability 
R&D The ratio of total research and development cost to total assets 
R&D missing An indicator which equals to 1 if the value of research and 
development cost is missing 
ROA Return on asset, measured as the ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items over total assets 
Volatility The standard deviation of firms ROA over the past five years 
Segment The number of business segments 
Size The logarithm of the firm’s total assets 
  
Variables in Additional 
Tests 
 
#RPT Number of RPTs disclosed in a firm’s annual filing 
DRPT An indicator which equals to 1 if a firm discloses any RPTs; zero 
otherwise 
Audit Committee An indicator which equals to 1 if a firm has designated its audit 
committee as the authority to review and approve RPTs; zero 
otherwise. 
Restate Prob.   The probability of firms restate their statement in a given year 
Written Policy An indicator which equals to 1 if a firm has adopted a written RPT 
policy; zero otherwise. 
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Figure 1: Sample Match Procedure 
(Group A2) 
133 NonBig-4 
in Canada 
(Group A1) 
133 NonBig-4 
in U.S. 
(Group B1) 
133 Big-4 Small 
in U.S 
(Group B2) 
133 Big-4 Small 
in Canada 
(Group C1) 
320 S&P 500 in 
U.S. 
by 
industry, 
size and 
ROA 
 
Match 
 
Match 
 
Match 
 
PCAOB firms 
 
Non PCAOB firms 
 
There is no matched Canadian firm because 
all large Canadian firms have shares traded 
in U.S. exchange and therefore are subject 
to PCAOB regulation. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
 
  Initial Final 
Main tests 
 
 All non-Big-4 clients in Russell 3000  
 
 
483  
 Excluding financial and utility firms -210  
 Excluding incomplete RPT disclosures in any year -123  
  Excluding firms missing governance data -17   
Total non-Big-4 Clients (“non-Big-4 Small”)  133 
    
+ Matched Big-4 Clients in Russell 3000 (“Big-4 Small”)  133 
    
+ Matched non-PCAOB non-Big-4 clients in Canada  133 
    
+ Matched non-PCAOB Big-4 clients in Canada  133 
 
Total Big-4 and Non-Big-4 Small firms                             
 
532 
x): Total Number of Years   6 
=Total Firm-Year Observations (Big 4 and non-Big 4 Small 
firms)  3,192 
    
Additional Tests 
 
All S&P 500 Composite Firms  
 
 
500  
 Excluding financial and utility firms -123  
 Excluding incomplete RPT disclosures in any year -24  
  Excluding firms missing governance data -33   
Total Large Big-4 clients (Big-4 Large firms)  320 
x): Total Number of Years   6 
=Total Firm-Year Observations   1,920 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Big-4 Small, NonBig-4 Small and Big-4 Large (US firms) 
 
 U.S. non-Big-4 Small U.S. Big-4 Small  U.S. Big-4 Large Total  
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
$RPT (%)  2.65   19.04   0.79   4.73   0.10   0.53   0.86   9.59  
#RPT  0.99   1.39   0.67   1.14   0.95   1.40   0.89   1.35  
DRPT  0.49   0.50   0.39   0.49   0.48   0.50   0.46   0.50  
Written Policy  0.32   0.47   0.37   0.48   0.55   0.50   0.45   0.50  
Audit Committee  0.63   0.48   0.74   0.44   0.39   0.49   0.53   0.50  
AuditFee ($mil)  0.75   0.64   1.22   1.25   8.74   10.50   5.05   8.56  
AAER Prob.  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   -     0.00   0.00  
Auditor Change  0.06   0.23   0.03   0.18   0.01   0.08   0.03   0.16  
Auditor Market Share  0.04   0.08   0.25   0.11   0.29   0.11   0.22   0.15  
Big 4   -       -      1.00    -      1.00    -      0.76   0.43  
Busy  0.70   0.46   0.74   0.44   0.71   0.45   0.72   0.45  
CEO Tenure  8.65   7.81   9.65   8.04   6.39   5.67   7.70   6.98  
CEO Duality  0.42   0.49   0.43   0.50   0.64   0.48   0.54   0.50  
Customer Importance  0.39   0.39   0.04   0.09   0.15   0.18   0.18   0.27  
Delaware  0.62   0.49   0.66   0.47   0.62   0.49   0.63   0.48  
Late  79.92   17.98   78.30   18.63   53.76   8.25   65.83   18.86  
Foreign Operation  0.33   0.47   0.38   0.49   0.37   0.48   0.36   0.48  
Dual Share  0.05   0.22   0.07   0.26   0.05   0.21   0.05   0.23  
Firm Age  14.90   5.94   13.57   5.88   17.07   4.87   15.72   5.59  
Industry Competition  0.06   0.04   0.06   0.04   0.06   0.04   0.06   0.04  
Ext. Director  75.63   11.86   79.72   11.67   84.13   9.08   81.06   11.01  
Inst. Holdings  78.17   26.61   85.36   24.07   75.79   13.75   78.65   20.49  
AR & INV  0.23   0.17   0.23   0.16   0.20   0.14   0.21   0.16  
Leverage  0.16   0.28   0.20   0.27   0.29   0.17   0.24   0.23  
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Size (Logat)  5.75   1.24   5.93   1.04   9.71   1.22   7.87   2.27  
Loss  0.24   0.43   0.33   0.47   0.05   0.22   0.16   0.37  
Exchange  0.69   0.46   0.66   0.47   0.25   0.43   0.45   0.50  
PB   5.01   32.41   4.70   12.62   4.26   5.54   4.54   17.37  
Quick  2.98   3.74   2.82   2.77   1.53   1.17   2.18   2.52  
Restate Prob.  0.02   0.03   0.02   0.03   0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02  
R&D  0.10   0.18   0.13   0.24   0.06   0.05   0.09   0.15  
R&D missing  0.38   0.49   0.33   0.47   0.39   0.49   0.37   0.48  
ROA  (0.03)  0.36   (0.03)  0.36   0.07   0.08   0.02   0.26  
Volatility  0.12   0.26   0.10   0.21   0.03   0.05   0.07   0.17  
Segment  5.01   3.61   5.17   3.31   8.17   5.07   6.71   4.64  
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Panel B: Control Group (Canada) vs. Treatment Group (U.S.) 
 
 
 Canada U.S.   
 Big-4 Small NonBig-4 Small Big 4 Small Non-Big-4 Small Total  
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
$RPT 0.67 3.74 2.19 6.62  0.79   4.73   2.65   19.04  1.49 9.62 
#RPT 0.80 1.06 1.11 1.06  0.67   1.14   0.99   1.39  0.88 1.16 
DRPT 0.46 0.50 0.65 0.48  0.39   0.49   0.49   0.50  0.50 0.50 
Post 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Leverage 0.59 0.94 0.94 2.22  0.20   0.27   0.16   0.28  0.48 1.26 
Logat 5.37 2.16 5.43 1.94  5.93   1.04   5.75   1.24  4.91 2.22 
Loss 0.37 0.48 0.47 0.47  0.33   0.47   0.24   0.43  0.41 0.49 
PB Ratio 3.29 38.09 2.76 28.31  4.70   12.62   5.01   32.41  3.38 28.05 
R&D 0.06 0.21 0.10 0.27  0.13   0.24   0.10   0.18  0.10 0.25 
R&D 
Missing 0.61 0.49 0.51 0.50  0.33   0.47   0.38   0.49  0.45 0.50 
ROA (0.14) 0.83 (0.62) 1.64  (0.03)  0.36   (0.03)  0.36  (0.21) 0.99 
  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel A compares U.S. sub-samples that 
are subjected to AS 18. Panel B compares U.S. sample groups with Canadian control sample groups.
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 $RPT
2 #RPT 0.09***
3 DRPT 0.10*** 0.72***
4 Written Policy -0.04 0.02 -0.00
5 Audit Committee -0.00 -0.02 -0.07*** -0.01
6 audit_feesM -0.04* 0.05* 0.07*** 0.14*** -0.23***
7 post 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.05* 0.01 0.02
8 AAER Prob. 0.03 -0.03 -0.04* 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.05**
9 Auditor Change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04* -0.07*** 0.05* 0.00
10 Auditor Market Share -0.09*** -0.01 0.01 0.13*** -0.17*** 0.32*** -0.02 0.02 -0.04*
11 Big 4 -0.10*** -0.04* -0.04 0.14*** -0.11*** 0.28*** -0.00 0.03 -0.11*** 0.69***
12 Busy 0.04* -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.06** -0.04 0.09*** -0.01 -0.05* -0.01 0.07*** 0.02
13 CEO Tenure 0.00 0.05* 0.10*** -0.16*** 0.08*** -0.12*** -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.02
14 CEO Duality -0.05* 0.01 0.03 0.05* -0.12*** 0.12*** -0.04* 0.10*** -0.03 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.18***
15 Customer Importance 0.02 0.06** 0.09*** -0.04 -0.11*** 0.16*** -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.38*** -0.45*** 0.00 0.04* 0.02
16 Delaware 0.04* -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.15*** -0.02 -0.12*** -0.00
17 Late 0.12*** 0.02 0.03 -0.19*** 0.16*** -0.31*** -0.08*** -0.04* 0.11*** -0.34*** -0.42*** 0.13*** 0.14*** -0.11*** 0.10*** 0.03
18 Foreign Operation 0.04 -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.05* 0.07*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05** 0.08*** -0.05*
19 Dual Share -0.02 0.05* 0.11*** -0.08*** 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.06** 0.09*** -0.06** -0.01 0.04* 0.02 0.01
20 Firm Age 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.04 -0.00 0.05** 0.08*** -0.14*** 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.20*** -0.21*** 0.05*
21 Industry Competition -0.01 0.04* 0.03 -0.01 -0.06** 0.06** -0.03 0.05* -0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.38*** -0.01 0.02 0.06**
22 Ext. Director -0.02 -0.23*** -0.21*** 0.09*** -0.12*** 0.26*** 0.01 0.07*** -0.05** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.07*** -0.18*** 0.09*** -0.05* 0.05* -0.28*** 0.05*
23 Inst. Holdings -0.08*** -0.14*** -0.08*** 0.03 0.08*** -0.03 -0.07*** 0.11*** -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.05* -0.03 -0.02 0.17*** -0.06** -0.06**
24 AR & INV 0.00 0.03 0.04* -0.04* 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.14*** 0.01 -0.06** -0.07** -0.23*** 0.04 -0.01 0.08*** -0.04 0.06** 0.09***
25 Leverage 0.37*** 0.04* 0.06** 0.05* -0.11*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.07*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** -0.08*** 0.03 -0.10*** -0.05* -0.09*** -0.10***
26 Logat -0.12*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.19*** -0.29*** 0.65*** 0.04 0.05** -0.11*** 0.49*** 0.52*** 0.03 -0.18*** 0.23*** -0.07*** -0.04* -0.66*** 0.00
27 Loss 0.08*** -0.07*** -0.05* -0.09*** 0.18*** -0.14*** 0.05* -0.05* 0.04 -0.13*** -0.12*** 0.11*** 0.01 -0.15*** -0.03 0.12*** 0.30*** 0.03
28 Nasdaq 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.17*** 0.35*** -0.31*** -0.00 0.05* 0.09*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.10*** 0.17*** -0.14*** -0.02 0.03 0.29*** 0.01
29 PB Ratio -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04* -0.03 0.05* 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05* 0.05* 0.02 0.02
30 Quick -0.01 -0.07*** -0.04* -0.07*** 0.12*** -0.13*** -0.00 -0.07*** 0.08*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.01 0.09*** -0.10*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.17*** -0.02
31 Restate Prob. 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.05* 0.10*** -0.08*** -0.24*** 0.18*** 0.01 -0.05* -0.03 0.08*** 0.05* -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.10*** -0.10***
32 R&D 0.20*** -0.04* -0.04 -0.06** 0.11*** -0.11*** -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.09*** -0.07** 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.10*** -0.05* 0.04* 0.21*** 0.02
33 R&D missing -0.02 0.10*** 0.10*** -0.05* -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.08*** -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.18*** 0.03 0.00 -0.05* -0.05* 0.03 -0.20***
34 ROA -0.26*** 0.03 0.03 0.05* -0.09*** 0.07*** -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.09*** -0.06** 0.07*** 0.02 -0.04* -0.24*** -0.01
35 Volatility 0.16*** -0.04* -0.02 -0.07** 0.11*** -0.13*** -0.01 -0.03 0.04* -0.14*** -0.15*** 0.09*** 0.05* -0.10*** -0.01 0.06** 0.24*** 0.00
36 Segment -0.05* -0.04* -0.04* 0.11*** -0.15*** 0.44*** -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.25*** 0.20*** -0.01 -0.13*** 0.06** 0.12*** 0.01 -0.24*** 0.28***
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Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
19 Dual Share
20 Firm Age 0.03
21 Industry Competition -0.04* 0.06**
22 Ext. Director -0.13*** 0.06** 0.02
23 Inst. Holdings 0.04 -0.14*** 0.07*** 0.16***
24 AR & INV -0.02 0.05* 0.17*** -0.07*** 0.13***
25 Leverage 0.02 0.03 -0.08*** 0.13*** -0.05* -0.19***
26 Logat -0.01 0.23*** -0.04 0.35*** -0.02 -0.12*** 0.27***
27 Loss -0.05* -0.21*** -0.06** -0.07*** -0.06** -0.12*** 0.05** -0.35***
28 Nasdaq -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.27*** 0.09*** 0.05* -0.22*** -0.49*** 0.16***
29 PB Ratio 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 0.05* -0.06** 0.09*** 0.05*
30 Quick -0.03 -0.05* 0.01 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.34*** 0.15*** 0.25*** 0.00
31 Restate Prob. 0.04* -0.12*** -0.05* -0.03 0.02 0.05** -0.01 -0.12*** 0.20*** 0.06** -0.01 -0.00
32 R&D -0.02 -0.11*** -0.05* -0.06** -0.19*** -0.19*** 0.24*** -0.30*** 0.37*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.11*** 0.09***
33 R&D missing 0.06** 0.04 -0.19*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.15*** 0.22*** 0.15*** -0.10*** -0.18*** -0.02 -0.15*** 0.27*** 0.01
34 ROA 0.03 0.14*** 0.05** 0.06** 0.20*** 0.16*** -0.30*** 0.28*** -0.51*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.06** -0.08*** -0.82*** 0.07***
35 Volatility -0.03 -0.17*** -0.05* -0.09*** -0.18*** -0.17*** 0.18*** -0.31*** 0.36*** 0.11*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.01 0.69*** -0.08*** -0.68***
36 Segment -0.06** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.24*** -0.01 0.11*** -0.02 0.42*** -0.15*** -0.26*** -0.06** -0.13*** -0.04 -0.18*** -0.08*** 0.14*** -0.18***
  
 
39 
Table 4: Test of H1 - AS 18 Effect on RPT 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent = $RPTs RPTs 
NonBus 
RPTs Bus RPTs |(2)-(3)| 
      
Treat × Post -1.315** -0.737** -0.578 0.159 
 (-2.39) (-2.40) (-1.32) (0.73) 
Treat 5.971 0.015 5.956*  
 (1.48) (0.01) (1.72)  
Post 0.478 0.341 0.137  
 (1.50) (1.27) (0.88)  
Size -0.280* -0.190 -0.090  
 (-1.74) (-1.56) (-0.86)  
ROA -0.068 0.212 -0.280  
 (-0.15) (0.59) (-1.05)  
PB Ratio -0.004 -0.005 0.001  
 (-0.96) (-1.11) (0.50)  
R&D -0.828 -0.831 0.004  
 (-0.79) (-1.06) (0.01)  
R&D missing -0.240 -0.478 0.238  
 (-0.48) (-1.30) (0.73)  
Leverage 0.259 0.360 -0.102  
 (0.96) (1.51) (-0.62)  
NonBig-4 0.450 0.692 -0.242  
 (0.92) (1.59) (-0.90)  
      
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 3,192 3,192 3,192  
Adj.R2  0.189 0.065 0.153   
 
 
Table 4 reports regression results where $RPT is the dependent variable in column 1 with t-statistics 
reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Fama-French 48 fixed effects are included in each model 
and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***,**,* indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: AS 18 Effects on RPTs Conditional on Auditor Types or Fraud Risks 
 
Panel A: AS 18 Effect on RPTs Conditional on Auditor Types 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent = $RPTs RPTs 
NonBusiness 
RPTs 
Business 
RPTs |(2)-(3)| 
      
Nonbig4 × Post -1.704** -0.398* -1.296* 0.898 
 (-2.06) (-1.78) (-1.71) (1.35) 
Post  -0.187* -0.098** -0.082 0.016 
 (-1.85) (-2.28) (-1.14) (0.04) 
NonBig-4 3.362 0.898 1.528 0.63 
 (0.62) (0.60) (0.34) (0.02) 
Size -0.157** -0.033* -0.098**  
 (-2.30) (-1.71) (-2.47)  
ROA 1.277 0.285 0.647  
 (1.46) (1.44) (1.35)  
PB Ratio -0.009 -0.003 -0.008  
 (-1.31) (-1.33) (-1.62)  
Leverage 1.786 0.543 0.798  
 (1.34) (1.19) (1.29)  
R&D 0.518 -0.041 -0.174  
 (0.33) (-0.13) (-0.28)  
R&D Missing -0.644 -0.074 -0.021  
 (-1.59) (-1.13) (-0.16)  
Firm Age -0.038 -0.012 -0.029  
 (-1.52) (-1.57) (-1.42)  
Ext. Director -0.016 -0.004 -0.008  
 (-0.92) (-0.70) (-0.91)  
Inst. Holdings -0.001 -0.001 0.001  
 (-0.10) (-0.41) (0.10)  
Dual Share -0.530* -0.061 -0.213**  
 (-1.72) (-1.46) (-2.57)  
CEO Tenure -0.011 -0.003 -0.011  
 (-0.73) (-0.56) (-1.48)  
CEO Duality 0.209 0.049 0.042  
 (0.83) (0.79) (0.33)  
      
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 1,596 1,596 1,596  
Adj.R2  0.368 0.167 0.278   
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 Panel B: AS 18 Effect on RPTs Conditional on Fraud Risks 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent = RPTs 
NonBusiness 
RPTs 
Business 
RPTs |(2)-(3)| 
Risk × Post -1.765** -0.183 -1.583** 1.400*** 
 (-2.11) (-1.18) (-2.21) (5.43) 
Post  -0.128 -0.183** 0.056 0.239 
 (-0.57) (-2.23) (0.26) (1.16) 
Risk 4.377 0.448 3.929* (0.63)*** 
 (1.52) (0.52) (1.69) (3.11) 
      
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 1,596 1,596 1,596  
Adj.R2  0.195 0.096 0.151   
 
 
 
Panel C: AS 18 Effect on RPTs Conditional on Auditor Types and Fraud Risks  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent = All RPTs All RPTs  
Auditors = Nonbig4 Big4 |(1)-(2)| 
    
Risk × Post -3.636** -1.196* 2.440*** 
 (-2.39) (-1.90) (2.38) 
Post  -0.035 -0.103 0.239 
 (-0.04) (-0.28) (0.01) 
Risk 18.624** -3.630 22.254*** 
 (2.17) (-1.31) (6.58) 
    
Controls Yes Yes  
Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
Observations 798 798  
Adj.R2  0.397 0.069   
 
Table 5 reports regression results where $RPT is the dependent variable in with t-statistics reported in 
parentheses below each coefficient. Fama-French 48 fixed effects are included in each model and standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level***,**,* indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Test of H2 - AS 18 Effect on Audit Fees 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent =  AuditFee AuditFee 
   
RPT × Post 0.003  
 (0.69)  
RPT -0.003  
 (-0.71)  
Non-Business RPT × Post  0.016** 
  (2.50) 
Non-Business RPT   -0.001 
  (-0.46) 
Business RPT  × Post  0.004 
  (0.92) 
Business RPT  -0.004 
  (-0.85) 
Post 0.006 0.004 
 (0.21) (0.14) 
Size 0.440*** 0.445*** 
 (14.16) (14.18) 
ROA -0.110*** -0.117*** 
 (-2.63) (-2.88) 
Segment 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (2.88) (2.84) 
Loss 0.162*** 0.163*** 
 (3.45) (3.47) 
Late 0.001 0.001 
 (0.85) (0.92) 
Busy 0.045 0.045 
 (0.79) (0.79) 
Quick -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (-3.20) (-3.21) 
Leverage -0.002 -0.054 
 (-0.02) (-0.59) 
AR & INV 0.458** 0.450** 
 (2.24) (2.20) 
Foreign Operation 0.123** 0.121** 
 (2.28) (2.25) 
Volatility 0.127 0.131* 
 (1.61) (1.66) 
Auditor Market Share 0.167 0.164 
 (0.65) (0.63) 
Customer Importance -0.053 -0.055 
 (-0.54) (-0.56) 
 Auditor Change -0.518*** -0.529*** 
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Table 6 reports regression results where the natural logarithm of audit fees is the dependent variable with t-
statistics reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Fama-French 48 fixed effects are included in each 
model and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***,**,* indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (-4.07) (-4.13) 
NonBig-4 -0.410*** -0.412*** 
 (-5.19) (-5.21) 
   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,596 1,596 
Adj.R2  0.560 0.561 
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Table 7: AS 18 Effects on Audit Fees Conditional on Auditor Types or Fraud Risks 
 
Panel A: AS 18 Effects on Audit Fees Conditional on Auditor Types 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent = Log (fees)      
  Nonbig4 Big4 Nonbig4 Big4 |(1)-(2)| |(3)-(4)| 
RPT × Post 0.006 0.005   0.001  
 (1.64) (0.89)   0.08  
RPT -0.007** 0.014***   0.021***  
 (-2.05) (2.97)   (13.46)  
NonBusiness RPT × 
Post   0.018** 0.046**  0.028* 
   (2.07) (2.42)  (1.85) 
NonBusiness RPT    -0.003 0.012  0.015 
   (-1.31) (0.93)  (1.40) 
Business RPT × Post   0.011*** 0.001  0.01*** 
   (2.95) (0.26)  (2.79) 
Business RPT   -0.011*** 0.015***  0.026*** 
   (-3.07) (3.50)  (22.49) 
Post -0.042 0.075* -0.044 0.073* 0.117*** 0.117*** 
 (-0.86) (1.88) (-0.90) (1.85) (3.57) (3.63) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 798 798 798 798   
Adj.R2  0.563 0.476 0.565 0.476     
 
  
 
45 
Panel B: AS 18 Effects on Audit Fees Conditional on Fraud Risk 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent = Log (fees)      
  High Risk Low Risk High Risk Low Risk |(1)-(2)| |(3)-(4)| 
RPT × Post 0.001 -0.001   0.002  
 (0.29) (-0.23)   (0.18)  
RPT -0.002 0.002   0.004  
 (-0.45) (0.54)   (0.67)  
NonBusiness RPT × 
Post   0.025*** -0.034  0.059*** 
   (2.95) (-1.38)  (7.70) 
NonBusiness RPT    -0.007 0.000  0.007 
   (-1.06) (0.00)  (1.02) 
Business RPT  × Post   0.002 0.002  0.000 
   (0.54) (0.58)  (0.00) 
Business RPT   -0.002 -0.001  0.001 
   (-0.50) (-0.17)  (0.08) 
Post -0.005 0.033 -0.007 0.035 0.038 0.042 
 (-0.10) (1.10) (-0.14) (1.11) (0.46) (0.53) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 798 798 798 798   
Adj.R2  0.496 0.630 0.497 0.630     
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Panel C: AS 18 Effects on Audit Fees Conditional on Auditor Types and Fraud Risk 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent= log(fees)         
Auditor= NonBig4  Big4 NonBig4  Big4 
Risk = High Low High Low High  Low  High  Low 
RPT × Post 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.013     
 (1.16) (0.44) (0.13) (1.28)     
RPT -0.005* -0.001 0.012** 0.011*     
 (-1.89) (-0.25) (2.60) (1.76)     
NonBusiness RPT × 
Post     0.032** -0.029 0.043** 0.149 
     (2.13) (-1.38) (2.23) (1.22) 
NonBusines RPT      -0.006 -0.003 0.030 0.006 
     (-1.36) (-0.57) (0.70) (0.50) 
Business RPT  × Post     0.008*** 0.008 -0.003 0.013 
     (3.17) (0.96) (-1.04) (1.34) 
Business RPT     -0.007*** -0.006 0.012*** 0.014 
     (-3.77) (-0.79) (2.69) (1.00) 
Post -0.055 0.013 0.052 0.098** -0.061 0.016 0.053 0.093** 
 (-0.66) (0.26) (0.65) (2.15) (-0.72) (0.30) (0.65) (2.26) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 
Adj.R2  0.496 0.619 0.387 0.577 0.498 0.619 0.387 0.577 
 
Table 7 reports cross-sectional analysis results where logarithm of audit fees is the dependent variable with t-statistics reported in parentheses below each 
coefficient. Fama-French 48 fixed effects are included in each model and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***,**,* indicate two-tailed 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sample in Panel A is partitioned by Audit Type; Sample in Panel B is partitioned by 
the median of fraud risk; Sample in Panel C is two way partitioned by Audit Type and Fraud Risk.
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Table 8: AS 18 effect on RPT Governance 
  
  (1) (2) 
Dependent =  Audit Committee Written Policy 
   
Post 0.336*** 0.490*** 
 (3.81) (5.25) 
Size 0.120 0.130 
 (0.89) (1.07) 
ROA -0.735 0.959* 
 (-1.17) (1.90) 
PB Ratio 0.072** -0.002 
 (2.28) (-0.49) 
Leverage -0.326 -0.508 
 (-0.93) (-0.94) 
R&D 0.224 1.031 
 (0.16) (1.12) 
R&D Missing 0.252 -0.551* 
 (0.86) (-1.94) 
Firm Age -0.029 -0.079*** 
 (-1.25) (-3.23) 
Ext. Director 0.023* -0.003 
 (1.89) (-0.27) 
Inst. Holdings -0.002 0.001 
 (-0.37) (0.14) 
Dual Share 0.506 -0.479 
 (0.85) (-0.81) 
CEO Tenure 0.006 -0.040** 
 (0.30) (-1.98) 
CEO Duality 0.065 0.189 
 (0.24) (0.77) 
Exchange 1.410*** -0.182 
 (4.76) (-0.66) 
Delaware 0.033 -0.294 
 (0.11) (-1.04) 
Non-Big-4 -0.373 -0.075 
 (-1.34) (-0.29) 
   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,596 1,596 
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.072 
 
Table 8 reports LOGIT regression results where the adoption of certain RPT governance practice is the 
dependent variable with t-statistics reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Fama-French 48 fixed 
effects are included in each model and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***,**,* indicate two-
tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 Alternative RPT Measures 
 
Panel A: Alternative RPT Measures for RPT Tests 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent =  #RPTs DRPTs 
Treat × Post -0.212*** -0.157* 
 (-2.69) (-1.67) 
Treat -0.941* -1.379* 
 (-1.88) (-1.77) 
Post -0.014 -0.107 
 (-0.24) (-0.87) 
   
All Controls Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 3,192 3,192 
Adj.R2  0.068 0.063 
 
 
Panel B: Alternative RPT Measures for Audit-Fee Tests 
 
Dependent = Log (fees) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RPTs= #RPTs #RPTs DRPTs DRPTs 
RPT × Post -0.002  0.003  
 (-0.08)  (0.05)  
RPT -0.015  0.019  
 (-0.64)  (0.35)  
NonBusiness RPT × Post  -0.073  -0.091 
  (-0.66)  (-0.71) 
NonBusiness RPT   -0.023  -0.031 
  (-0.37)  (-0.40) 
Business RPT  × Post  0.019  0.041 
  (0.68)  (0.69) 
Business RPT  -0.039  -0.022 
  (-1.22)  (-0.37) 
Post 0.025 0.019 0.027 0.020 
 (0.72) (0.56) (0.70) (0.57) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,596 1,596 1,596 1,596 
Adj.R2  0.556 0.556 0.555 0.555 
 
Table 9 reports main analysis results using alternative RPT measures with t-statistics reported in parentheses 
below each coefficient. In Panel A Column 1, the dependent variable is the #RPTs; In Panel A Column 2, the 
dependent variable is the DRPTs; In Panel B Column 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the #RPTs; In Panel B 
column 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the DRPT. Fama-French 48 fixed effects are included in each model 
and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***,**,* indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 10 Alternative Firm Size (i.e., Tests on Large S&P 500 Firms) 
 
Panel A: RPT Tests for S&P 500 Firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent = RPTs RPTs 
Non-
Business 
RPTs 
Business 
RPTs   
AAER Risk=       High  Low 
      
      
Post  -0.014 -0.004 -0.011 -0.021 0.000 
 (-0.88) (-0.49) (-0.80) (-0.72) (0.01) 
      
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 960 960 
Adj.R2  0.063 0.057 0.038 0.095 0.037 
 
 
Panel B: Audit Fees Test for S&P 
500 Firms 
 
 
 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent = Log (fees)      
  Full Sample High Risk Low Risk Full Sample High Risk Low Risk 
RPT × Post -0.002 -0.007 0.035    
 (-0.07) (-0.19) (1.02)    
RPT 0.042 0.033 0.032    
 (1.51) (1.06) (0.92)    
Non-Business RPT × 
Post    0.006 0.195 0.043 
    (0.04) (1.02) (0.06) 
Non-Business RPT     -0.005 -0.038 0.037 
    (-0.22) (-0.85) (1.13) 
Bus RPT  × Post    0.019 -0.174 0.017 
    (0.53) (-0.76) (0.51) 
Bus RPT    0.049* 0.051** 0.035 
    (1.84) (2.59) (0.75) 
Post 0.118*** 0.139*** 0.099*** 0.118*** 0.137*** 0.099*** 
 (8.36) (5.32) (4.26) (8.33) (5.23) (4.19) 
 (-2.46) (-1.48) (-2.41) (-2.46) (-1.45) (-2.41) 
       
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,920 960 960 1,920 960 960 
Adj.R2  0.784 0.790 0.787 0.784 0.790 0.786 
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Panel C: RPT Governance Test for S&P 500 Firms 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent = Audit Committee Audit Committee Audit Committee Written Policy Written Policy Written Policy 
AAER Risk= Full Sample High  Low  Full Sample High  Low  
Post  -0.018 0.037 -0.043 0.033 -0.033 -0.029 
 (-0.26) (0.27) (-0.34) (0.43) (-0.23) (-0.22) 
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,920 960 960 1,920 960 960 
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.124 0.119 0.084 0.106 0.092 
 
Table 10 reports main analysis results using S&P 500 composite firms as the sample with t-statistics reported in parentheses below each coefficient. 
Fama-French 48 fixed effects are included in each model and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***,**,* indicate two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All S&P 500 firms in our sample are audited by Big 4 auditors. Panel A investigate the AS 18 
effects on RPT behaviors for S&P 500 firms; Panel B investigates the AS 18 effects on audit fees for S&P 500 firms; Panel C investigates the RPT 
governance change around the adoption of AS 18 for S&P 500 firms. 
 
 
 
